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Law Review Publishing: Thoughts on Mass Submissions, 
Expedited Review, and Potential Reform 
 




 The current law review publishing system—in particular, mass 
submissions and expedited review—works well for prestige-driven professors; 
however, it places a tremendous burden on the editors of journals lower in the 
hierarchy.  This problem is exacerbated by several professorial tactics 
including, most significantly, submitting articles to journals from which the 
professor would never accept an offer—not even when he or she fails to receive 
a “better” offer through the expedite process. 
 This Essay discusses a potential fix: the eight-hour offer window.  If a 
journal were to adopt a formal policy of holding its publication offers open for 
only eight hours, professors would, in theory, be unable to use the offer in the 
expedite process.  Therefore, professors would not submit their articles to this 
journal unless and until they were serious about publishing in it. 
 Unfortunately, what is good in theory does not always work in practice.  
This Essay discusses how professors would modify their existing tactics—
tactics which currently include misrepresenting the terms of an offer in the 
expedite process—in order to defeat this attempted reform.  The Essay also 
explores specific ways that a journal could overcome these tactics and 
implement meaningful reform despite the professoriate’s desire to protect the 
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INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS IN PUBLISHING 
 
As a practicing criminal defense lawyer I enjoy writing law review 
articles.  It’s a great way to advocate for our individual rights, provide useful 
information for the defense bar, and, in some cases, obtain meaningful change 
within the system.  I even enjoy (for the most part) the process of publishing 
the articles after I write them.  This year, when submitting two articles for 
publication, I closely followed the Submission Angsting Spring 2017 blog post 
and comment thread at PrawfsBlawg.1  This is a public forum but one that few 
people, other than law professors and would-be law professors, even know 
exists.  The thread essentially allows professor-types to share information and 
opinions—which they nearly always do anonymously—about the law review 
publishing process.   
Although many law professors frequently complain about the current 
process, it actually works just fine for them; however, it is a tremendous 
burden for the editors at the less prestigious journals.  From a journal editor’s 
perspective, there are at least two significant problems with the law review 
submission process.  First, professors typically engage in mass submissions of 
their articles, often submitting to more than one hundred journals 
simultaneously.  This takes a toll on the editors who must wade through 
hundreds and sometimes thousands of articles before making offers to fill only 
a few publication slots.2 
Second, despite all of the journal editors’ work in reviewing and selecting 
articles, most professors will not accept their offers of publication.  In most 
cases, a professor is merely hoping to obtain an offer of publication to trigger 
the expedited review process.  That is, the professor intends to use the journal’s 
offer to shop the article around to higher ranked journals.3  Journal editors 
know this.   
However, what some journal editors may not realize is that, in many cases, 
a professor submits his or her article knowing in advance that he or she would 
not, under any circumstances, accept an offer to publish from that journal—
not even if the professor fails to obtain a “better” offer during the expedite 
process.  The reality is that many prestige-driven professors believe an article 
                                                 
1 Matt Bodie, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 9, 2017), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-
2017.html [https://perma.cc/8AP7-UNV4]. 
2  See infra Part I.A.  
3  See infra Part I.B. 




is better left unpublished than published in, and associated with, the offering 
journal.4   
The burden of these and other professorial practices falls on the journal 
editors.5  And the further down the law review hierarchy the journal is located, 
the greater the risk of abuse and the greater the burden.  But there is a 
theoretical fix to this absurd, prestige-based law review publishing system.  A 
reform-minded law journal could announce, before law review submission 
season begins, that its publication offers will be held open for only eight 
hours.6   
In theory, this eight-hour offer—sometimes called an exploding offer—
would accomplish two things.  First, because eight hours is not enough time 
for professors to request an expedited review from other journals, it should 
greatly increase the acceptance rate of the journal’s offers.  And second, 
because professors will know, before submitting to the journal, that they will 
be unable to use its offer to move up the prestige ladder, they will not submit 
to this journal unless and until they are serious about publishing in it.  This 
would dramatically reduce the number of frivolous submissions.7 
The problem, of course, is that what is good in theory can be thwarted in 
practice.  Professors have already developed numerous tactics for gaming the 
current system, 8  and they could easily adapt these existing practices to 
contravene a journal’s attempted reform.  The professors’ modified tactics 
would likely include using a journal’s eight-hour offer to request expedited 
reviews simply by misrepresenting the deadline to the higher ranked journals.9  
Similarly, professors have already considered the possibility of shaming and 
blackballing student editors for far less than what is proposed in this Essay, 
and editors can expect similar retaliation for any attempts to change the status 
quo.10 
                                                 
4  See infra Part I.B. 
5  I use the term “professorial practices” because those who write law review 
articles are overwhelmingly professors and aspiring professors.  In one recent study, 
more than sixty percent of articles were written by authors who were already affiliated 
with law schools.  See Albert H. Yoon, Editorial Bias in Legal Academia, 5 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 309, 319–20 (2013).  Of the remainder, many authors are no doubt 
publishing in order to join those ranks.  Further, most practitioner-authors who are not 
attempting to enter academia simply have no incentive to engage in many of the tactics 
described in this Essay.  Therefore, although “author” is technically a more accurate 
word, I frequently use “professor,” “professoriate,” “professor-types,” or a similar 
term to describe those who publish law review articles.      
6  See infra Parts II and III.  
7  See infra Part II.  
8  See infra Part I.B. 
9  See infra Part IV.  
10  See infra Part V.  
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Part I of this Essay exposes some professorial tactics related to mass 
submissions and, particularly, the expedite game.  Part II discusses the eight-
hour offer as a means of reform, and Part III discusses how such reform could 
be implemented.  Part IV examines some potential roadblocks standing in the 
way of change, and explains how professors would likely attempt to 
circumvent a journal’s reform efforts.  Part V discusses the potential 
repercussions that journal editors could face for changing the current system—
a system that exists to serve the needs of professors and elite journals.  The 
Conclusion then examines the post-reform world of law review publishing, 
after a hypothetical, wide-scale implementation of the eight-hour offer.11   
 
I.  THE LAW REVIEW WAY 
 
From the standpoint of journal editors, the law review publishing system 
has at least two significant flaws: mass submissions and the expedited review 
process.  As explained below, these two flaws negatively impact the editors at 
nearly every law journal, albeit to varying degrees.  Generally—or at least 
within a very wide “relevant range” of journals—editors at lower ranked 
journals suffer the greatest impact.       
 
A.  Mass Submissions 
 
Once an author finishes an article, the first step in getting that article 
published is to select the journals to which it will be submitted.  For simplicity, 
this Essay will focus only on general interest flagship journals and will ignore 
online companion journals and specialty print journals.12 
The relative desirability of the journals is open to some debate.  However, 
for those authors who are law professors (or hoping to become law professors), 
                                                 
11  The existing law review publishing system has numerous problems, many of 
which are only superficially addressed in this Essay.  One such problem is the 
staggering cost of article submissions—particularly for independent authors.  For a 
deeper examination of that issue, readers should consult Timothy Lau’s article, A Law 
and Economics Critique of the Law Review System, 55 DUQUESNE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017).  In it, Lau examines law review publishing from a systematic 
point of view and offers valuable insights for additional reform.    
12  Law professors rely heavily on rankings and have thrown themselves into great 
turmoil trying to rank specialty journals and online journals relative to flagship 
journals.  To rank a specialty journal, some professors advocate adding thirty, forty, 
or even fifty spots to the journal’s school’s U.S. News & World Report (USN) ranking, 
while others recommend avoiding specialty journals entirely.  With regard to online 
journals, some professors view those at top twenty USN schools as preferable to 
flagship journals of lower ranked schools, while others believe that online publications 
should not even be counted as publications or, at least, should be listed in a separate 
section of the CV.     




journal rank is determined by the U.S. News & World Report (USN) rank of 
the law school where the journal is published.13  In close cases, a law professor 
may give the edge to the journal—or, more accurately, the school—with the 
better USN peer reputation score, which is a component of its overall USN 
rank.  As one professor explains, “I’m a fan of peer score from USNWR.  It is 
the perfect indicator for what we care about: how schools are perceived by law 
profs.”14 
There are other ways that professors could evaluate law journals, including 
the various Washington and Lee (W&L) journal-ranking methodologies. 15  
However, the majority view among law professors is this:  
 
[A]lways go with U.S. News. The reason is that people 
reviewing your CV tend to have an idea of where that 
journal’s school is ranked; nobody walks around with 
encyclopedic knowledge of W&L rankings, nor will most take 
the time to look it up. For instance, W&L ranks Lewis and 
Clark as #40 (USNEWS ranking = 92) and Alabama as #41 
(USNEWS ranking = 28). NOBODY would consider a L&C 
placement as even comparable to an Alabama placement, 
much less superior.16 
   
Another professor felt even more strongly about USN’s superiority over 
W&L.  “DEFINITELY USNWR! The only people who care about the W&L 
rankings are individual authors attempting to justify a lower placement (‘but 
the journal is ranked #89 on W&L!’).”17  
                                                 
13 See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT: EDUCATION, 2018 Best Law Schools, 
https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools 
[https://perma.cc/V4EH-H5XL] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017). 
14 Persephone, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 20, 2016, 
4:59 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2016/comments/page/4/#comments [https://perma.cc/TA9Y-9A8X]. 
15  See WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW: LAW LIBRARY, Law 
Journals: Submissions and Ranking, 2008 – 2015, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ 
[https://perma.cc/98XE-NXL4] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017). 
16  AnonProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 18, 2017, 
1:55 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/6/#comments [https://perma.cc/495A-M66P]. 
17  AnonProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 14, 2016, 
8:45 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2016/comments/page/2/#comments [https://perma.cc/F9DM-X389]. 
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This approach is rather strange, as USN ranks law schools and not 
law journals. 18   And some have convincingly argued that USN—“the 
surviving rump of an otherwise defunct news magazine”—doesn’t even do 
that properly.19  Nonetheless, in the rankings- and status-obsessed world of 
legal academia, USN has become the near-universally accepted method for 
ranking law journals.  One benefit of using the USN is that it allows professors 
to quickly judge and rank each other—both in hiring and promotion 
decisions—without having to look at the substance of each other’s work.  One 
professor explains it this way: 
 
I have chaired my school’s appointments committee several 
times, and I talk quite a bit with chairs at other schools. Here's 
my opinion—we are impressed by publications that we 
immediately know are “good.” . . . Thus, a publication in the 
flagship journal in any school in the T30 of U.S. News will 
get our attention—probably true of the T50 as well (although 
the closer you get to 50, the less that’s the case). From there 
on out, your publication very quickly is seen as less 
impressive.20  
 
Professor James Grimmelmann warned that such simple thinking “is a 
stinging indictment of how law schools hire and promote.  Colleagues who 
don’t look past the citation to the substance of an article when making such 
decisions are shirking their responsibilities as scholars and members of a 
learned profession . . . .”21  Nonetheless, this warning has largely fallen on deaf 
ears.  Professors love both heuristics and rankings, and the practice of judging 
a colleague by the journal in which he or she has published is deeply ingrained 
in the legal academy.  Therefore, it is likely here to stay.   
For the practitioner-author who has no desire to become a professor, 
additional factors may come into play when deciding between journals.  These 
                                                 
18  See Lau, supra note 11 (“[L]egal academics are taking the rankings far beyond 
their intended use, and essentially are ranking journals based on factors that have little 
to do with the journals themselves.”). 
19  Paul Campos, Scenes from the Class Struggle, INSIDE THE LAW SCHOOL SCAM 
(Feb. 29, 2012), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/02/scenes-from-
class-struggle.html [https://perma.cc/3UQ9-CWFW]. 
20  anonprof, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 3, 2017, 
8:49 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/14/#comments. 
21  James Grimmelmann, Exploding Offers from Law Reviews: A New Trend?, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 20, 2015, 9:43 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/10/exploding-offers-from-law-
reviews-a-new-trend.html [https://perma.cc/D4DW-XRKA]. 




might include how quickly a particular journal will publish the article or 
whether the journal’s name is recognizable to judges, lawyers, and clients—
three groups that are typically unaware of the USN rankings.22  But these 
deviations from the norm are not enough to upset the USN applecart in any 
significant way.  That is, the Duke Law Journal is better than the Arizona Law 
Review which is better than the Louisiana Law Review, and so on.   
While every professor wants to publish in the highly ranked journals, these 
journals can only publish a very small fraction of the articles they receive.  For 
example, “[t]he Southern California Law Review receives thousands of 
unsolicited manuscripts each year.  From this pool, we ultimately select about 
12 articles for publication.” 23   And this leads to the problem of mass 
submissions.24  Even though (and because) every professor wants to publish in 
a top journal, it would be unwise to submit only to such journals.  There are 
two reasons for this. 
First, the overwhelming majority of professors will be rejected by the top 
journals, yet many of them will want to publish their work somewhere—more 
on that later.  Therefore, they must submit more broadly than just the elite 
journals.  And second, although a handful of professors will ultimately win the 
publication jackpot and receive an offer from a top journal,25 the most common 
way to achieve that is first to obtain an offer from a lower ranked journal and 
then send an expedited review request to the top journal which then reviews 
the article and eventually offers to publish it.  This expedite process is the 
subject of the next Part. 
For these reasons, it is very common for a professor to submit his or her 
article to one hundred or more different journals.  For example, in response to 
an author who reported submitting only to eighty-five journals, one professor 
advised, “[i]n my opinion, submitting to just the top 85 journals is insufficient.  
I would recommend at least 150 journals.”26   
                                                 
22  As an extreme example, I am highly confident that most judges, lawyers, and 
clients where I practice law in the Midwest would assume that a publication in the 
Michigan State Law Review (currently USN 96) is better than a publication in the 
Emory Law Journal (currently USN 22). 
23  SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW: SUBMISSIONS: Article Submissions, 
http://lawreview.usc.edu/submissions/ [https://perma.cc/7MC5-7LDR] (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2017).  
24  For an explanation of the structural reasons for mass submissions, see Lau, 
supra note 11. 
25  What constitutes a “top journal” is relative.  One artificial category is the USN 
top fourteen, or T-14 for short.  Other cutoffs bandied about by the professoriate 
include T-20, T-25, T-50, T-60, T-80, and T-100.       
26  Been There, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 15, 2016, 
8:14 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2016/comments/page/10/#comments [https://perma.cc/7WKD-H6V9]. 
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This mass submission strategy causes several problems.  Most 
significantly and obviously, “[m]assive simultaneous submission is a 
nightmare for overworked students, undercuts the quality of the review they 
are able to give, and injects a large quantity of randomness into the article 
placement process.”27  In addition, while this mass submission strategy is 
currently necessary for an author to get the “best” placement, it comes at a 
financial cost. 
While many of the USN top one hundred journals accept submissions via 
email, most require or at least “strongly prefer” submissions through one of 
the online systems, Scholastica or Expresso.28  Journals probably prefer this, 
in part, to help manage the massive number of articles they receive each year.  
From an author’s perspective, the cost of submitting a manuscript to one 
journal through Scholastica is currently $6.50, and the cost through Expresso 
is $3.10. 29   However, from the standpoint of some authors, while these 
submission systems may offer a couple of conveniences, there are no real 
benefits over a simple, cost-free email.    
The costs of submissions add up quickly.  Assume that a very cost-
conscious author submits to one hundred journals before eventually receiving 
his or her first offer.  Also assume that twenty-five of those journals are 
indifferent to the method of submission and will gladly accept emailed articles.  
Of the remaining seventy-five, perhaps twenty-five will accept submissions 
through the less expensive Expresso system, leaving fifty submissions through 
Scholastica.  Under these very conservative assumptions, the cost-conscious 
author would incur submission costs of over $400 for a single article.   
As Timothy Lau explains, this is a staggering cost on a per article basis, 
making it difficult for many practitioners, law clerks, and other independent 
writers to fully participate in the law review publishing process.30  And even 
for professors who are able to shift submission costs to their employer-law 
schools, the law schools may also be shifting the costs: “a lot of people that 
                                                 
27  Grimmelmann, supra note 21. 
28  See, e.g., GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW: MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSIONS: 
Scholastica Submissions, http://www.gwlr.org/submissions/ [https://perma.cc/X9XC-
GBQD] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).  
29  Many journals have switched from Expresso to the far more expensive 
Scholastica, possibly, some have argued, to discourage submissions.  Unfortunately, 
as discussed in the following paragraphs and in the next Part, while higher costs 
discourage submissions from serious authors with limited resources, they will not 
discourage frivolous submissions from professors—many of whom do not pay for 
their own submissions and have an incentive to submit even to journals in which they 
would never accept an offer of publication.    
30  See Lau, supra note 11. 




submit . . . aren’t paying their own bills.  Students’ tuition money is funding 
all or most of their submissions.”31 
Worse yet, the $400-per-article figure cited above is probably low.  In 
response to a question about the costs of submitting a single article, one 
professor wrote: 
 
I think I have racked up about $650 in submission fees which 
fortunately my school pays for. . . . [L]aw faculties are not 
price sensitive since our employer pays the fee and we have 
every incentive to maximize the number of submissions since 
for many of us our annual compensation is impacted by article 
placement.32 
 
As the above comment indicates, the mass submission system does have a 
very significant benefit for professors: if one submits to enough journals, one 
will usually receive an offer of publication.  Unfortunately for journal editors, 
as difficult as it is for them to read, evaluate, manage, and respond to these 
mass submissions, what follows next is even worse.   
 
B.  Expedited Review 
 
When professors submit their article to a law journal, they are not doing 
so with the goal of actually publishing in that journal.  Rather, they want to 
receive an offer they can then use to send expedited review requests to higher 
ranked journals.  And sometimes there are multiple rounds of expedites.  One 
first-time author described it this way in the course of posting a question: 
 
I’m facing my third expedite (T100 to T50 to T30).  From a 
courtesy/professionalism perspective, is there any limit to 
how many times I can or should use the full week [of the offer 
window] to try to go up the food chain?  I think I'm playing 
the game exactly right, but I want to make sure I am not 
missing any downside.  It feels weirdly exploitative.33 
                                                 
31  YesterdayIKilledAMammoth, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 26, 2017, 12:10 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-
2017/comments/page/10/#comments [https://perma.cc/P872-986T]. 
32  Anonymouse, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 28, 
2017, 9:57 AM) (emphasis added), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-
2017/comments/page/11/#comments [https://perma.cc/K8UG-ZGQV]. 
33  AngstingAnon, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 3, 
2017, 11:18 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-




A seasoned professor reassured him: “that’s right—that’s how the game is 
played.  Keep on expediting up!  Journals don’t like it, but they expect it . . . 
.”34  Another professor described the significance of the expedite process: “if 
by mid-season (meaning, around late February) you’re not in the expedite 
cycle your season is pretty much doomed . . . . By that time, most T50 journals 
are so overwhelmed with expedites that they have no time for anything else.”35  
Similarly, another professor wrote that “a lot of the ‘better’ journals will not 
even look at an article . . . until they receive an expedite request on that 
particular piece.”36   
Given this state of affairs, the first offer of publication is so important that 
some professors take very creative measures to obtain it; then, once obtained, 
it allows them to set the expedite machinery in motion.  For example, one 
author reports that “profs submit to their own students, creating an indefensible 
conflict of interests, just to [receive an offer and] get into the expedite 
pipeline.”37  Law professor Ken Levy elaborates: 
 
[S]tudents feel obliged to accept submissions by their own 
professors.  This much is forgivable, I suppose.  What is less 
forgivable is the professors’ willingness to put them in this 
position to begin with.  They are in effect compelling the 
students to [offer to] publish their work, no matter how weak 
it may be . . . .38 
                                                 
angsting-spring-2017/comments/page/14/#comments [https://perma.cc/Z6Y9-
QUUK]. 
34  Angstingagain, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 3, 
2017, 11:45 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-
angsting-spring-2017/comments/page/14/#comments [https://perma.cc/T8UN-482N]. 
35  2Dings, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 16, 2017, 7:43 
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/3/ - comments [https://perma.cc/LFD3-5NL4]. 
36  Anon, Exploding Offers from Law Reviews: A New Trend?, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(Oct. 20, 2015, 9:47 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/10/exploding-offers-from-law-
reviews-a-new-trend.html [https://perma.cc/B5D8-LYGJ]. 
37  YesterdayIKilledAMammoth, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 15, 2017, 5:19 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-
2017/comments/page/3/#comments [https://perma.cc/HW3X-V22W]. 
38  Ken Levy, US Law Review’s Dirty Game: Review by Student, TIMES HIGHER 
EDUCATION (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.timeshighereducation.com/opinion/us-law-
reviews-dirty-game-peer-review-by-student.  Often, the article is indeed “weak,” and 
if the professor cannot get another offer in the expedite process, the offering law 
review is stuck with it.  See Albert H. Yoon, supra note 5, at 333 (“[I]nsider authors 




   
The anonymous commenter, above, also revealed another publication 
tactic.  “Other profs call their students who are editors and shill for a friend’s 
article”39—a favor that could, in theory, be returned at a future date if the 
professor currently doing the shilling ever has difficulty placing his or her own 
article.  One professor openly described and defended the practice this way:  
 
I have in the past, and likely would in the future, recommend 
pieces to our editors when I know they are in the pile. . . . I 
don’t say “you should publish this,” but I do say “here is what 
I liked about it and how I think it fits into the larger 
literature.”40   
 
Whether this particular practice is appropriate is the subject of much 
debate.  But what is not debatable is that, much like the ability to shift 
submission costs to their employer-law schools (and from there, possibly to 
the tuition-paying students), this practice gives some professors a tremendous 
advantage over practitioner-authors and even over less well-connected 
professors.41   
More troubling yet, some authors go to even greater lengths to get into the 
expedite game.  Rather than asking for an offer from their own students or 
relying on other professors at other schools to recommend the article to their 
students, some—hopefully a small minority—simply fabricate an offer out of 
whole cloth.  Professor Shima Baradaran Baughman urges her fellow 
professors to “[b]e honest with your expedites” and reports: 
 
I spoke with some editors at a T-10 law review that had a black 
list of authors that had faked expedites in the past that they 
                                                 
are less successful at leveraging offers from their own law reviews because their 
articles were qualitatively weaker that what their law reviews accept from outside 
authors . . . .”). 
39  YesterdayIKilledAMammoth, supra note 37. 
40  CBR, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 16, 2017, 2:09 
PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/4/#comments [https://perma.cc/W6LP-NP2C].  
41  This desire to build and use connections could explain the so-called vanity 
footnote.  Look at any article in any top journal, and you’ll likely see the professor 
gushing thanks to a dozen or more individuals and, additionally, to the organizers of 
numerous workshops.  This also gives some indication that the true cost of churning 
out a professor-written law review article goes well beyond the professor’s time and 
the $650 needed to submit the article through Scholastica and Expresso.  Conference 
fees, lodging, and travel no doubt add tremendously to the cost of this status-obsessed 
endeavor.       
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passed on [to] their faculty and new editors.   They had added 
an additional author this year because the particular author 
had faked an expedite from one top law review to another and 
the senior articles editors at those schools happened to be good 
friends.   Ouch.42 
 
 Ouch, indeed.  However, the professor-types actually have mixed 
views on this practice of fabricating offers.  One thought that blacklisting by 
the law journals was very troubling, potentially unfair, and simply too harsh.  
“Some people make bad decisions.  It ain’t murder, or even jaywalking, 
really.”43  Another disagreed.  “The list of blacklisted authors is correct—these 
miscreants [i.e., the authors who fake expedite] need to be punished and being 
blacklisted is most appropriate.” 44   Yet another performed a law-and-
economics analysis and, given the relatively mild punishment of blacklisting, 
concluded that from a risk-reward perspective, “any rational lower tiered 
author or those without any letterhead should ALWAYS make up fake 
expedites to the top journals.”45 
In any case, assuming a professor obtains an actual offer—whether from 
his or her own students, with the assistance of a friend at another school, and/or 
because of the article’s quality or appeal—the offering journal will usually 
allow a substantial period of time in which the professor may accept the offer.  
In my own experience, I have received acceptance deadlines ranging from one 
day to two weeks, but one week is by far the most common.  This one-week 
window, in essence, provides an author the opportunity to trade up to a higher 
ranked journal via the expedited review process. 
Some professors are so obsessed with the rankings game that they will 
attempt to trade up even one or two spots in the USN hierarchy—if for no other 
reason than to extend the expedite process and keep their article in play at the 
                                                 
42  Shima Baradaran Baughman, Underneath the Law Review Submission Process: 
Part VII Expedited Reviews, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 24, 2012, 11:30 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/04/underneath-the-law-review-
submission-process-part-vii-expedited-reviews.html [https://perma.cc/6B9H-P2SZ]. 
43  BDG, Underneath the Law Review Submission Process: Part VII Expedited 
Reviews, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 24, 2012, 6:14 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/04/underneath-the-law-review-
submission-process-part-vii-expedited-reviews.html [https://perma.cc/RD8F-55TB]. 
44  ex-dist.ct.law.clerk, Underneath the Law Review Submission Process: Part VII 
Expedited Reviews, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 25, 2012, 4:48 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/04/underneath-the-law-review-
submission-process-part-vii-expedited-reviews.html [https://perma.cc/J9RZ-8YGC]. 
45  TJ, Underneath the Law Review Submission Process: Part VII Expedited 
Reviews, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 25, 2012, 1:31 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/04/underneath-the-law-review-
submission-process-part-vii-expedited-reviews.html [https://perma.cc/W4YV-69RP]. 




top journals just a little bit longer.46  An incredibly common practice—but an 
amazing one, at least to me—is to ask the offering journal for an extension of 
the offer’s deadline for the specific and stated purpose of pursuing better 
journals. 
In general, the behavior exhibited during the expedite process would be 
unimaginable in nearly any other context.  The obvious and often-used analogy 
is that participating in the expedite process is like agreeing to go to prom with 
someone on a contingent basis—that is, I’ll go with you only if I don’t find a 
more attractive date by, say, the Tuesday before the dance.  Calling on Monday 
night to get an extension until, say, Thursday is just layering a second insult 
on top of the first.        
But here the journal editors must share blame.  It is their practice of 
holding offers open for one week or more, and then often agreeing to extend 
deadlines even further, that enables the expedite system to function. 47  
Essentially, the one-week offer (and extensions thereof) turns the lower ranked 
journals into “uncompensated screening staff” for the more prestigious 
journals.48  That is, the lower ranked journals are the grease which allows the 
class-based machinery to operate.  Professor Andrew Chongseh Kim described 
the negative impact of this system on an actual journal as follows: 
 
If we [professors] get a better offer before deadline, we drop 
the original offer like a bad habit and hopefully expedite our 
way all the way to the top.  The practice is often tough for 
lower ranked journals [that] have to scramble to find new 
articles. . . .  Over the course of a month, the [editors at one 
journal] had made fifteen separate offers to authors to fill one 
slot, and each time the author declined their offer after 
expediting upwards.49     
  
                                                 
46 See Joseph Scott Miller, The Immorality of Requesting Expedited Review, 21 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (some professors will even make 
“sideways moves to journals that are not more desirable but that provide a later-
expiring offer, and thus supply more time in the notional trading pit.”). 
47  See Joseph Scott Miller, A Modest Proposal for Expediting Manuscript 
Selection at Less Prestigious Law Reviews (UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2016-26), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811817 [https://perma.cc/YH8N-7YHS] 
(arguing that “the journal obtains no benefit from assisting the author in his or her 
efforts to shop the piece to more prestigious reviews”). 
48  Miller, supra note 46. 
49  Andrew Chongseh Kim, Exploding Offers from Law Reviews: A New Trend?, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 20, 2015, 9:04 AM) (emphasis added), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/10/exploding-offers-from-law-
reviews-a-new-trend.html [https://perma.cc/7Q9Z-ZEWZ]. 
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And if this isn’t bad enough, there is an even bigger kick in the head 
awaiting the editors at some law journals.  Some law professors are so status 
conscious that they may ultimately reject a journal’s offer even if they fail to 
receive a better offer from their expedited review requests.  In other words, 
some professors believe that non-publication is preferable to publication by 
the offering journal.   
For example, one professor cautioned aspiring scholars not to “‘get it in 
print’ somewhere that is going to hurt you.  There are some journals where 
you’d be better off to not publish at all than to . . . have placed a piece there.”50  
Others have offered specifics on how to identify such journals.  One professor 
warned would-be academics that “a placement outside the T100 is worse than 
having not published at all.”51  Others are even more conscious of these class 
distinctions.  One would-be professor reported that “I have received advice 
that I should not accept any offer outside of T-60, as doing so could hurt my 
chances once (or if) I actually go on the job market.”52 
As a lawyer who writes about matters of importance to other practicing 
lawyers, I find this thought process difficult to grasp.  I once even passed on a 
USN top fifty journal offer in favor of a lower journal with an earlier 
publication date, thus allowing me to get my work into the hands of my 
colleagues and in front of trial judges nearly a year sooner.  Conversely, a 
professor’s view that his or her work is, in some cases, best left unpublished 
seriously calls into question the value of that work.53   
More specifically, some law professors find themselves trapped in an 
uncomfortable area between lawyer and scholar: they have never (or barely) 
practiced law, yet also lack formal, advanced training in an academic 
discipline.54  The result is that neither practicing lawyers nor true academics 
                                                 
50  anonProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 25, 2016, 
7:58 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2016/comments/page/5/#comments [https://perma.cc/88AQ-X82N]. 
51  anonprof, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 3, 2017, 
8:49 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/14/#comments [https://perma.cc/X4KY-5A29]. 
52  recentgrad, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 28, 2017, 
2:49 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/12/#comments [https://perma.cc/UUU4-B2VS]. 
53  In addition, “[i]t also runs contrary to any pedagogic principle to have lowly-
ranked journals discussed as if they were pornographic publications, to have real-
world, good faith student editors at lowly-ranked schools treated as the dalit of law 
students.”  Lau, supra note 11.  
54  This is not true for every professor.  However, the classic profile of a new 
professor-hire includes a J.D. from a top fourteen USN law school, a clerkship, and 
little or no legal practice experience.  Further, for those professors who have such 
experience, it is usually far removed from the courtroom and even from client contact 




have much interest in the subject matter of their work.  Even their fellow law 
professors may have little interest.  The following lament nicely captures this 
predicament, which is perhaps what drives some law professors’ 
preoccupation with class, rank, and prestige over substance: 
 
Look, the sad truth is rarely will people read your work, but 
many in your career will read your CV.  They’ll look over 
your publications and they will absolutely use your 
placements as a proxy for how good a scholar you are.  When 
it’s tenure time, you’re [sic] faculty (whether they admit it or 
not) will be considering your placements . . . . [And] we all 
realize that, given the proliferation of journals today, almost 
anything anyone writes can get published somewhere.55 
 
Yet the professors’ obsession with prestige does not prevent them from 
using the “proliferation of journals”—those outside the “T100” or “T-60,” 
depending on the particular professor—to obtain that first offer which, in turn, 
will be used solely for purposes of expediting.  One professor explained, “I 
don’t think it’s unethical to submit to places you wouldn’t accept.  Does it suck 
for the students, yes.  But it is a known component of our publication system 
that relies heavily on expedites.”56   
Until Spring 2017, I certainly did not know this practice was a “component 
of our publishing system.”  (Another known, but less common, component is 
reneging on an agreement after having accepted the offer.)57  Nonetheless, 
another professor agreed, and placed blame for this practice—i.e., submitting 
to journals where the author would not publish under any circumstances—on 
the higher ranked journals.  “I too submit to journals I would never accept.  
                                                 
of any kind.  See Paul Campos, Legal Academia and the Blindness of the Elites, 37 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 179, 180–81 (2014). 
55  AnonProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 23, 2016, 
10:11 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-
angsting-spring-2016/comments/page/4/#comments [https://perma.cc/8Z55-7FMF]. 
56  Magnolia, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 16, 2017, 
9:45 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/3/#comments [https://perma.cc/6LRJ-HSUU]. 
57  See Dave Hoffman, Breaching a Law Review Contract?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 
27, 2015, 5:13 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/03/breaching-
a-law-review-contract.html [https://perma.cc/26R3-2ALM] (discussing how 
professors sometimes breach publication agreements in favor of a better offer that was 
made after the less prestigious offer had been accepted). 
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Given how the system works (i.e., many journals will not look at your piece 
until they get an expedite), I think you’re foolish not to.”58 
One professor reported engaging in this practice on a very wide scale, 
stating that he or she “placed in a T30 journal—after submitting to 150 
journals, most of which I wouldn’t have accepted . . . .”59  Another professor 
specifically advised: “Regardless of whether you’d publish in the journal, 
submit to the top 100 . . . .”60  And another reported that he or she recently 
“[g]ot three offers including top 80, but decided to withdraw” the article 
instead of publishing it with any of the offering journals.61   
Although lower ranked journals are hit the hardest by this practice, even 
highly ranked journals are not immune.  A newer professor was presumably 
serious when he or she asked this question: “If most of the other law reviews 
still have not responded [to my expedite requests] by next Wednesday—which 
is likely, given how early it is [in the submission season]—should I just let my 
T30 LR offer lapse and take my chances?”62    
After being repeatedly victimized by such prestige-driven tactics, one 
lower ranked journal had enough and temporarily instituted an extreme 
measure that sent some law professors into a state of emotional turmoil: the 
journal made its publication offers on a first-come, first-serve basis.  That is, 
once an offer is accepted by one of the authors to whom it was extended, the 
other offers for that publication slot would be withdrawn from those who were 
too slow on the draw—that is, too status conscious—to quickly accept.63   
In light of this, one professor observed that the current system of mass 
submissions and expedites is “great for journals at the top but bad for journals 
                                                 
58  AnonProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 16, 2017, 
11:36 AM) (emphasis added), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-
2017/comments/page/3/#comments [https://perma.cc/3E66-UNXA]. 
59  Anon, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 1, 2017, 3:52 
AM) (emphasis added), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-
2017/comments/page/12/#comments [https://perma.cc/K5J4-H5US]. 
60  Anon, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 17, 2017, 8:56 
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/4/#comments [https://perma.cc/G6RB-LUT4]. 
61 Anon, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 20, 2017, 1:59 
AM) (emphasis added), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-spring-
2017/comments/page/7/#comments [https://perma.cc/SW9U-9LB7]. 
62  blawprof, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 10, 2017, 
8:46 AM) http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017.html [https://perma.cc/4MYW-BZB9].  
63  Kim, supra note 49. 




at the bottom.”64  Of course, it’s great for professors, too.  This same professor 
realized that, if enough lower ranked journals got fed up and started taking 
similarly drastic measures, “it could destabilize the entire, highly flawed, law 
review system that is central to all of our careers.”65  Destabilizing “the entire, 
highly flawed, law review system” is precisely what the next Part examines. 
 
II.  THE EIGHT-HOUR OFFER 
 
As explained above, the current system forces editors—particularly those 
at the lower ranked journals—to spend a tremendous amount of time and effort 
reading, evaluating, and making offers for articles they will never have the 
opportunity to publish.  In addition, there are substantial financial costs for 
authors to submit articles to the journals—costs which, in many cases, will be 
paid for by tuition-paying students (including, ironically, the student editors 
who are forced to read the mass submissions that generated the costs in the 
first place). 
Also as explained above, it is the journals’ one-week offer window (along 
with extensions thereof) that enables this class-based system to function.  In 
theory, then, one solution to this problem is for a journal—regardless of its 
rank—to change to an eight-hour offer window.66  Or, as James Grimmelmann 
has argued, “[a]ll journals should make short exploding offers.” 67   And 
because an eight-hour offer window is in each journal’s individual best interest 
regardless of how long other journals keep their offers open, any journal that 
implements this policy would—again, at least in theory—reap immediate 
benefits.   
Admittedly, as the next Part demonstrates, professors may be able to 
circumvent such a reform—particularly if it is adopted by only a small number 
of non-elite journals.  But for now, consider how such a policy would 
theoretically work if adopted by only a single journal, “Journal 100.”  (This 
example could easily be applied to a journal ranked in the top fifty, or seventy-
fifth, or into the triple digits for that matter.)  Hundreds of professors currently 
submit to Journal 100 for the primary, and sometimes the sole, purpose of 
obtaining an offer to use in the expedite process.  The result is that the editors 
of Journal 100 will be making offers to professors who will not accept them. 
                                                 
64  Id.  
65  Id. (emphasis added).  
66  See, e.g., Dave Hoffman, Free Advice to Incoming Law Review Boards, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 4, 2013), 
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/03/what-can-law-review-editors-do-
to-attract-better-articles.html [https://perma.cc/3KPB-ARNB] (regarding offer length, 
“[a] week is fine, and maybe the norm.  But you can offer less time too.  Consider this: 
Columbia routinely gives until the same-day close of business to make a decision. 
Why shouldn’t you?”). 
67  Grimmelmann, supra note 21. 
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But what if Journal 100 was able to communicate to professors, before the 
submission season began, that its offers would come with an eight-hour 
acceptance window that will not be extended under any circumstances?  For 
example, if Journal 100 makes an offer on a Tuesday evening, the professor 
would have until 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday to accept it, or the offer will expire.  
Allowing eight business hours ensures that the professor has enough time to 
check his or her email and respond to the offer, but not much else.   
Assuming that this policy is effectively communicated to professors 
before the submission season, would professors still submit to Journal 100?  
There would be no incentive to submit to this journal merely to obtain an offer 
to use in the expedite process, as eight hours is not enough time for other 
journals to conduct an expedited review.  Knowing this upfront, professors 
would only submit to this journal after they have been rejected by, or are tired 
of waiting for, the higher ranked journals.  That is, professors would only 
submit to Journal 100 if and when they are serious about publishing in Journal 
100. 
If adopted on a wide scale, the eight-hour offer would effectively turn the 
system from a bottom-up process to a top-down process.  Currently, lower 
ranked journals screen articles for more prestigious journals, which then select 
the articles they want to publish.  With an eight-hour offer window, however, 
the more prestigious journals would first select the articles they want to publish 
(without the benefit of receiving expedited review requests), and the lower 
ranked journals would publish the articles that remain.  The end result, 
however, would be the same.  The only difference is whether an article moves 
upstream (via expedited review) or downstream before eventually finding its 
home.68     
It is true that Journal 100 would receive far fewer submissions if professors 
knew the journal would only hold the offer open for eight business hours.  But 
that is the point of this proposed reform.  Journal 100 does not want to be 
overwhelmed with reading, evaluating, and making offers on articles that it 
has no chance to publish (often because professors have, deceptively, first 
ruled out the journal and then submitted to it).  Instead, Journal 100 would 
receive far fewer submissions, but would have much more time to spend on 
each submission and, more importantly, would have a much better chance of 
actually publishing those articles for which it does make offers. 
And there is a potential, additional benefit—though not one that would 
accrue unless the eight-hour policy was widely adopted.  If enough journals 
moved to an eight-hour window, aggregate submission costs would fall 
dramatically.  The reason is that professors would only submit to the journals 
in which they truly would be willing to publish, and mass submissions would 
end.  Granted, the professors who eventually published in Journal 100 would 
                                                 
68  See Miller, supra note 46 (explaining that the system is a “self-interested 
matching market, where nearly every piece finds a spot to rest when the music, as it 
were, stops.”).  




incur the same submission costs on a piecemeal basis working down the USN 
ranks, rather than incurring them all upfront in a mass submission designed to 
work up the USN ranks.  But the professors who published in the higher ranked 
journals would actually spend less, as they would not continue to submit down 
the ranks after receiving their offer.  Therefore, if the eight-hour offer system 
were widely adopted, no professor would spend more, but most would spend 
less, to publish an article.69 
Many law professors complain about the current law review publishing 
system including, oddly, the features that benefit them the most: mass 
submissions and expedited review.  But such complaints are merely knee-jerk 
reactions to the numerous rejections that all authors inevitably receive when 
submitting on such a wide scale.  As one professor explained, “the angsting 
comes from how rejection-filled publishing is—even when you’re successful. 
. . . If you end up publishing with a very good law review like the Wisconsin 
Law Review, your cycle is likely illustrated by rejections from nearly all 
journals ranked higher than Wisconsin.”70  Another professor added that “[t]he 
process is so bruising because, even if you end up getting a great placement 
like Wisconsin . . . you’ll [also] get rejected from many, many journals ranked 
below Wisconsin.”71     
Despite the angst associated with the current system, professors would 
complain far more loudly if mass submissions and expedited reviews were 
replaced with a universal, eight-hour offer window.  With an eight-hour offer, 
professors would no longer be able to submit to one hundred or more journals 
in a mindless pursuit of hyper-technical, but illusory, prestige-based 
distinctions.  For example, a professor who submits to the top thirty journals 
and receives an eight-hour offer from journal number thirty would, as a 
practical matter, be forced to accept that offer without the luxury of expediting 
to journal number twenty-five, or to the so-called top fourteen. 
The loss of these artificial and meaningless distinctions (e.g., “T-14” 
versus “T-25” and “T-50” versus “T-60”) would also force law professors to 
judge each other not on the precise USN rank of the law school that houses the 
journal in which an article was published, but instead on the substance of each 
other’s work.  Eliminating such a time-saving heuristic would also not sit well 
with the professoriate.  But this is a heuristic they should immediately abandon 
                                                 
69  I use the word “spend” loosely, as the professors typically do not pay for the 
costs of their mass submissions.  Rather, the costs are incurred by the professors’ law 
schools, which, in turn, may pay for these costs with tuition revenue.  
70  Farva, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 14, 2016, 10:12 
PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2016/comments/page/2/#comments [https://perma.cc/32UW-MT8D]. 
71  anon, Submission Angsting Spring 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 15, 2016, 8:43 
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2016/comments/page/2/#comments [https://perma.cc/LEK6-Q99C]. 
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regardless of whether the current system is reformed.  The reason is that, on 
the one hand, professors judge each other by their journal placements.  But on 
the other hand, many professors simultaneously declare that “[l]aw students 
are utterly unqualified to judge legal scholarship.”72  Professors could resolve 
these irreconcilable positions by simply judging one another on their work, 
rather than their journal covers.       
The truly elite USN journals would also like to preserve the status quo.  In 
the past, when lower ranked journals have used exploding offers, a group of 
elite journals promoted a policy through a joint letter, ostensibly for the greater 
good, where signatory journals committed to holding offers open for a full 
seven days.73  The reality is that a one-week offer window benefits the elite 
journals—in addition to other benefits, it gives them time to conduct expedited 
reviews and pickoff articles from lower ranked journals—which might explain 
why they promoted the policy in the first place.74 
And while elite journal editors benefit from the expedited review system, 
the “[s]tudent editors at less prestigious journals suffer not only a steady 
diversion of labor to others’ benefit, but also the demoralization of sowing 
again and again where they will not reap.”75  In short, whenever the elite law 
journals do one thing, it is often a good idea for the non-elites to do—or at 
least strongly consider doing—the opposite.   
 
III.  IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The previous Part discussed the impact of an eight-hour offer window if 
adopted by a single school and also if adopted more broadly.  For now, we will 
return to our discussion of one journal—Journal 100—and how it might 
implement such a policy.   
To begin, Journal 100 would have to give adequate notice of the policy 
before law professors submit their articles.  The current system of mass 
submissions and expedited review is deep-rooted; in fairness, it would be quite 
a shock to submit an article expecting business as usual only to receive an offer 
that remains open for eight business hours.  Unfortunately, Scholastica and 
Expresso do not appear to allow for such notice—other than Scholastica’s 
                                                 
72  Anonymous, Submission Angsting Fall 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 7, 2016, 
10:25 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/07/submission-
angsting-fall-2016/comments/page/2/#comments [https://perma.cc/8AQN-6V3V]. 
73  Paul Caron, Elite Law Reviews End “Exploding Offers”, TAXPROF BLOG (Apr. 
19, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/04/elite-law-reviews.html 
[https://perma.cc/5MB7-AW9E]. 
74  See Orin Kerr, Group of Law Reviews Adopts Position Against Exploding 
Offers: Will Other Journals Follow?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (April 19, 2011, 2:39 
PM), http://volokh.com/2011/04/19/important-group-of-journals-agree-to-end-
exploding-offers-will-other-journals-follow/ [https://perma.cc/6A8E-XJJ7]. 
75  Miller, supra note 46.  




generic (and often ignored) recommendation that authors check each journal’s 
guidelines and Expresso’s text box that usually indicates when a journal will 
open for submissions. 
One way to provide sufficient advance notice is for Journal 100 to consider 
closing its Scholastica and Expresso accounts—at least for one submission 
season—to instead accept submissions by email or its online system.  This 
would prevent professors from mindlessly clicking the journal cover (on 
Scholastica) or the journal name (on Expresso), and would instead force them 
to visit Journal 100’s website which would provide adequate notice of its eight-
hour policy.  Further, word of this new policy would quickly spread among the 
professoriate—a group that monitors the smallest disturbances in the status 
quo and quickly communicates them through its numerous blogs.76  Journal 
100’s notice on its website could read as follows: 
 
Journal 100 is pleased to accept, via email, unsolicited articles 
and essays for publication.  The Journal is happy to consider 
manuscripts that have been submitted simultaneously to other 
journals; exclusive submission is not required.  However, if 
The Journal decides to extend an offer of publication, that 
offer will be held open for only eight business hours, i.e., until 
5:00 PM CST the business day following the evening that the 
offer was extended.  If the author does not accept by that time, 
the offer expires without further notice.  The Journal does not 
grant deadline extensions.      
 
The website should also give some indication of the purpose behind the 
policy.  For example: 
 
Journal 100 has adopted this policy in response to the 
problems of mass submissions and expedited review.  We 
understand that an author to whom The Journal extends an 
offer may receive other offers within the eight hour window.  
Therefore, receiving an offer from The Journal does not 
obligate the author to accept it.  However, due to the short 
time frame for acceptance (eight business hours), we 
recommend that authors not submit their work to us until they 
would give strong consideration to accepting an offer to 
publish in The Journal.    
 
                                                 
76  See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Northwestern Law Review Exclusive 
Submissions, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 28, 2016, 10:58 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/12/northwestern-law-review-
exclusive-submissions.html [https://perma.cc/YP9B-QJ6B] (announcing the journal’s 
new submission policy). 
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From the author’s perspective, it would be very helpful to provide 
additional information on the website.  This should be updated regularly, and 
may include the following: 
 
Authors should not submit their work until March 1, 2018, the 
day that The Journal will begin reviewing submissions.  The 
Journal will review submissions on a rolling basis until all 
available publication slots are filled.  The Journal publishes 
four issues per year—two during the Fall and two during the 
Spring—and generally publishes three articles per issue.  
Please check this website frequently for updates about the 
availability of open publication slots.     
Shortly after an author accepts an offer to publish in The 
Journal, he or she will be required to sign a publication 
agreement.  The publication agreement, which will be 
customized for each individual author’s name, manuscript 
title, and the anticipated volume and issue, is provided below 
in PDF format for review by prospective authors. 
 
For journals that already accept submissions via email—many do; some 
exclusively so77—eliminating Scholastica and Expresso would not be difficult.  
Further, even for journals that currently rely on these systems to manage their 
submissions, the eight-hour offer window is designed to reduce the volume of 
submissions—most notably, the articles that the journal would never have a 
realistic chance at publishing anyway.  Therefore, the journal that implements 
this policy will have less of a need for the submission management features of 
the two systems, and could easily survive without them for one submission 
season.  And given the exorbitant fees that Scholastica charges authors to 
submit—currently $6.50 to send one article to one journal—the change to cost-
free email would be welcomed by some authors.78               
           
IV.  ROADBLOCKS TO REFORM 
 
Unfortunately, there are many things that could stifle Journal 100’s reform 
efforts or might even prevent such efforts from getting off the ground.  First, 
journal editors are one-and-done; that is, they are editors for only one year, and 
by the time they learn the ropes of the law review publishing business they are 
moving on (hopefully) to real business and their first legal jobs.  They simply 
                                                 
77  See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE: PUBLICATIONS: LAW REVIEW: Article 
Submission, http://law.ubalt.edu/academics/publications/lawreview/submission.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/B3TU-G8JD] (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) (“To submit articles for 
review, please email your article, a cover letter, and curriculum vitae or resume.”). 
78  See Lau, supra note 11.  




may not have sufficient motivation—understandably so—to reform the 
system.79 
Second, if Journal 100 did institute an eight-hour offer policy, and if 
professors acted as they theoretically should, Journal 100 might receive its 
submissions later in the season.  This could interfere with the journal editors’ 
other obligations, including preparing for final exams.  In this case, journal 
editors may wish to consider the slightly more complex reform suggested by 
Professor Joseph Scott Miller, which includes “three integrated, data-driven 
steps,” and involves identifying, by institutional affiliation, which professor-
authors are most likely to accept an offer of publication.80    
Third, and most significantly, even assuming that professors visit Journal 
100’s website and read the eight-hour offer policy before submitting, they may 
simply decide to thwart Journal 100’s attempted reform effort.  That is, even 
knowing that an offer would be held open for only eight hours, a professor 
may submit his or her article, obtain an offer, and still use it in the expedited 
review process.  How could a professor do this given that eight hours is not 
enough time for another journal to conduct an expedited review?  Quite 
simply, nothing prevents the professor from misrepresenting the offer deadline 
to other journals, as letting the real deadline lapse does not matter when the 
professor had no intention of ever publishing with Journal 100 in the first 
place.   
This idea should not be surprising, as some authors have reportedly 
committed the more serious deception of fabricating the underlying offer on 
which the expedite request is based.81  Further, some professors who receive 
legitimate offers already alter their deadlines for purposes of expediting.  One 
professor explains that, “[w]hen I have had an expedite expire without another 
offer, I have gone back in to [S]cholastica [and] put in a new really long 
expedite deadline . . . .”82  Unilaterally extending the deadline of the (now-
expired) offer allows the professor to remain in the expedite game, even 
though he or she no longer has a pending offer and arguably should be removed 
from consideration.  The professor even reports that “I’ve done that twice now 
I think and both times I’ve received subsequent higher offers . . . .”83   
The important point, of course, is that if a professor can unilaterally extend 
the offering journal’s deadline after the offer has expired, nothing would 
prevent him or her from unilaterally extending the deadline in the first place, 
before making expedited review requests.  Journal 100’s eight-hour offer 
                                                 
79  In this case, a much simpler reform is to open for submissions later in the 
season.  This could, to some extent, also turn the system from a bottom-up expedite 
review process into a top-down process—if a journal opened after most of the journals 
above it (in the USN hierarchy) have filled their publication slots.   
80  See Miller, supra note 46. 
81  Baughman, supra note 42. 
82  Magnolia, supra note 56. 
83  Id.  
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would then become a one-week offer (or longer) for the creative professor’s 
intents and purposes.     
For this reason, the eight-hour reform would be far more effective if 
implemented by a journal prestigious enough that most professors would 
accept the journal’s offer if it was the only one they received.  For example, 
under the current system, if a professor receives an offer from a USN top sixty 
journal and fails to receive a better offer when expediting, the majority of such 
professors would accept the top sixty offer.  Therefore, most professors who 
would submit to a USN top sixty journal, knowing that any offer would be 
held open for only eight hours, would accept such an offer rather than 
artificially extend the deadline to gamble on a better outcome in the expedite 
process.84        
Alternatively, if a journal is lower in the USN pecking order, the eight-
hour reform could also be effective if it was adequately publicized.  A journal 
could, for example, do the opposite of what the elite schools did in their joint 
statement on offer length.85  Rather than announcing a one-week offer policy 
ostensibly for the greater good, a journal could announce its eight-hour offer 
policy in response to the numerous problems that plague law review 
publishing, including mass submissions, the expedited review process run 
amok, and the deceptive tactics employed by some professors.   
Making this known through a public statement would do at least two 
things.  First, it would probably win the journal some respect from the sizeable 
minority that is disgusted by the mindless pursuit of prestige in legal academia.  
And second, it would alert the higher ranked journals to the eight-hour policy.  
Then, if a higher ranked journal were to receive a professor’s expedited review 
request based on an offer from the lower ranked, signatory journal, its editors 
would know that the offer—or at least the deadline—on which the expedite 
request is based is not genuine.  Hopefully, if the editors of the higher ranked 
journals knew this, they would not tolerate such deception.86  
Theoretically, if a large majority of journals moved to an eight-hour offer 
policy, the practice of expediting would grind to a halt.  Smaller scale 
implementations would, however, be vulnerable to abuse by prestige-driven 
professors.  But the amount of abuse would negatively correlate with the scope 
of the reform: the greater number of journals or the more prestigious the 
journal(s) that move to an eight-hour offer window, fewer and fewer professors 
would attempt to game the system.  If the Ohio State Law Journal, by itself, 
                                                 
84  Where this exact cutoff falls is open to debate, but the consensus seems to point 
to the top sixty—possibly because, at one time, an influential professor missed the top-
fifty cutoff and placed in the top sixty instead, thus moving the goalposts for what is 
considered an acceptable placement.   
85  The elite schools advocate for a seven-day offer window.  See Caron, supra 
note 73. 
86  See, e.g., Baughman, supra note 42 (discussing how some editors are already 
blacklisting authors who are caught fabricating offers to get into the expedite game). 




adopted the eight-hour offer, few professors would fabricate a longer deadline 
in order to jump into the expedite game.  Unfortunately, if the Ohio Northern 
University Law Review, by itself, adopted the eight-hour offer, the reform 
could yield some positive results—and certainly some respect—for the 
journal, but would not completely foreclose professorial abuse.    
 
V. BLACKBALLING IS A TWO-WAY STREET  
 
Law professor angst reaches its peak sometime between mid-February and 
mid-March, the heart of the law review submission season.  One illustration of 
this is a professor who sniped at his colleagues on the PrawfsBlawg angsting 
thread: “I’m forever baffled by the lack of reading comprehension skills 
displayed on this board—a board that, I thought, was populated by law 
professors.  Please reread my post.”87  He or she then went on to restate the 
technical distinction made earlier between submission strategies designed to 
win a “T14” placement versus those calculated to win a less prestigious “top 
20 or 25” placement.88  His or her colleagues’ failure to catch this subtle 
distinction in the earlier post is what caused the distress.   
For a more relevant example, consider this: some law journals often 
receive more than one thousand submissions to fill only a few publication 
slots.  Many journal editors, understandably, don’t take the time to respond 
with a rejection email to each and every professor who submits an article.  But 
professors know full well that when they don’t receive the nice thank-you-for-
submitting email, a journal’s failure to respond means it is not interested in 
publishing the article.  (Once again, the prom analogy is helpful: when your 
first choice for the dance won’t respond to you, the answer is “no.”)  
Nonetheless, although some professors complain about receiving the 
impersonal, standard rejection email, others complain when they don’t receive 
one.89  Some even contend, rather ironically, that the failure to send a rejection 
email is evidence of the students’ “solipsistic narcissism”90 and constitutes 
                                                 
87  AnonLawProf, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 24, 
2017, 12:31 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-
angsting-spring-2017/comments/page/9/#comments [https://perma.cc/E8A4-EYJT]. 
88  Id.  
89  I don’t have a preference as to whether journals send a rejection email.  
However, I can’t help but chuckle whenever I receive the form email that states: 
“Frequently we must make the difficult decision to turn down an excellent piece of 
scholarship.”  This language purposely stops short of telling me that my “piece of 
scholarship” was “excellent,” yet it still conveys the rejection in a pleasant way.    
90  anon, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 17, 2017, 3:29 
PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/21/#comments [https://perma.cc/4K99-GNV6]. 
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unethical behavior.91  One professor even hinted at potentially blackballing the 
student editors down the road.   
The discussion began with a complaint that “Harvard used to be a prompt 
and reliable reject, but has been a non-responder in the last couple of 
seasons.” 92   One professor suggested they could obtain the much desired 
rejection emails from Harvard and other schools “by simply sending e-mails 
to any journal that has not responded to us.  That way, they will desire to send 
rejections simply to avoid being swamped by e-mails.  Just my 2-cents.”93   
That advice certainly isn’t worth “2-cents,” but it likely wouldn’t cause 
the student editors any serious harm, either.  So another professor ramped it up 
a level: “if enough submitters make it known that editors who don’t act 
professionally enough may have it held against them in the future (e.g., VAP 
hiring decisions), that might scare them into doing their job.”94 
Similarly, recall the earlier discussion about the journal that made fifteen 
offers, still couldn’t fill its single publication slot, and therefore decided to 
make first-come-first-serve, exploding-type offers to induce an acceptance.  
The professor who wrote about that incident believed the journal editors made 
a “creative mistake,” as such offers could “discourage authors from submitting 
to [that] journal[] in the first place.”95 
To begin, this professor clearly did not grasp that, from the standpoint of 
the editors, “discourag[ing] authors from submitting” is the goal.  But then, 
and more to the point, the professor stated that, because the journal’s faculty 
advisors “say this will not be their standard practice going forward, I think it 
makes sense to keep the names of the journals out of this blog, and the 
comments, for now.”96  But he did not discourage disclosure via other means: 
“I won’t delete any comments that offer to share the names offline.”97 
                                                 
91  anon, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 17, 2017, 11:51 
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/20/#comments [https://perma.cc/BNC9-XRU4] (arguing 
that the failure to send a rejection email in certain instances is a “poor ethics practice[]” 
and violates “ethical norms”). 
92  thegatekeeper, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 1, 
2017, 11:42 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-
angsting-spring-2017/comments/page/13/#comments [https://perma.cc/8E9Z-E5EX]. 




94  anon, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 1, 2017, 12:43 
PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/13/#comments [https://perma.cc/T7S5-NB35]. 
95  Kim, supra note 49. 
96  Id. (emphasis added).  
97  Id. 




What professors forget is that blackballing and shaming can work both 
ways.  For example, the professor who was angered by not receiving his formal 
rejection email suggested holding such a benign, non-event against student 
editors when they later applied for teaching jobs.  Not only would that be 
grossly disproportionate to the students’ alleged “offense,” but this professor 
obviously didn’t consider that the students may start blackballing the 
professors. 
Perhaps journal editors will start passing along, to their successor editorial 
boards, the names of professors who repeatedly use the journal for the sole 
purpose of jumping into the expedite game.  Or worse yet for the professors, 
perhaps the editors will begin their own blog to share information with editors 
at other journals, much as the professors are currently doing when sharing 
information with professors at other schools.  In fact, as discussed earlier, one 
professor reports that this is already happening, albeit on a small scale (as far 
as we know).  Some journal editors are already blacklisting authors who are 
caught “mak[ing] up an offer to expedite on.”98  Expanding the blacklist to 
include those who employ other tactics—including tactics that professors 
widely view as innocuous—is just a few clicks of the keyboard away.   
Further, when some professors complain, they aren’t always making 
generic comments such as the worn-out criticism that “[l]aw students are 
utterly unqualified to judge legal scholarship”99—an odd complaint, given that 
the only thing separating student editors from some of their professors is one 
year of law school.100  Rather, despite a warning from a levelheaded colleague 
to leave students’ names off the PrawfsBlawg angsting thread, professors have 
publicly identified and criticized individual editors by their school, title, and 
name.101  Perhaps, then, the students will do the same.  Is this a risk professors 
want to take, particularly when their promotions, status, and sense of self-
worth can hinge on the already arbitrary distinction between, for example, 
“T50” and “T60”?   
Professors should not dismiss the possibility of this type of backlash.  After 
all, a mere three law students played a substantial, if not primary, role in 
                                                 
98  Baughman, supra note 42. 
99  Anonymous, Submission Angsting Fall 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 27, 2016, 
10:25 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/07/submission-
angsting-fall-2016/comments/page/2/#comments [https://perma.cc/RC8E-NUBR]. 
100  See Campos, supra note 54, at 180 (“A 2003 study found that the average 
amount of experience in the practice of law among new hires at top twenty-five law 
schools, among those hires who had any such experience, was 1.4 years.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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exposing other law school tactics, such as some schools’ use of misleading 
employment statistics for the purpose of increasing applications and artificially 
inflating USN rank. 102   The result of the students’ efforts was greater 
transparency and, not surprisingly, a massive reputational and financial hit for 
law schools.103  All it would take is a few enterprising journal editors to start 
sharing information and exposing law professor publishing tactics in a similar 
manner.  The result would be yet another black eye for the academy.              
             
CONCLUSION: PUBLISHING POST-REFORM 
 
The eight-hour offer window discussed in this Essay would not be popular 
with many professors.  But it is not designed to please the professors; rather, 
it is designed to alleviate the problems facing journal editors who receive mass 
submissions, yet find it difficult to induce professors to accept an offer of 
publication.     
As explained earlier, this reform would not temper the professors’ desire 
for prestige; however, it would prevent them from using the lower ranked 
journals in the mindless pursuit of that prestige.  That is, instead of using the 
lower ranked journals to keep the class-based machinery operating smoothly, 
professors would be forced to take some risks.   
For example, if the eight-hour offer was the industry standard then 
professors would have to decide when to submit to the top eighty journals, 
rather than continuing to wait on the top fifty.  On the one hand, being less 
class conscious could be rewarded: submitting to the top eighty earlier than 
other professors could yield an offer from a very desirable journal, such as the 
University of Miami Law Review.  On the other hand, because that offer would 
come with an eight-hour window, a professor would have to accept it before 
the Florida State University Law Review, for example, is able to complete its 
review and possibly make its own offer.  
Being forced to make such judgments would create a level of angst 
previously unknown to the professoriate.  Law professors, as a group, are very 
risk-averse and would not like the idea of their decisions possibly having sub-
optimal outcomes as measured by the USN rankings.  But this is not a real-
                                                 
102  Paul Campos, Goodbye is too Good a Word, INSIDE THE LAW SCHOOL SCAM 
(Feb. 27, 2013), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2013/02/goodbye-is-
too-good-word.html [https://perma.cc/W7BC-BUUG] (discussing how the “the 
tireless unpaid labor of Kyle McEntee, Patrick Lynch, and Derek Tokaz, aka Law 
School Transparency, found their way into the pages of the New York Times and the 
Wall Street Journal, and onto the CBS Evening News”). 
103  Paul Campos, Halfway Home, INSIDE THE LAW SCHOOL SCAM (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2015/03/halfway-home.html 
[https://perma.cc/FEG5-22MC] (“[T]his fall's entering class will be roughly around 
35,300 1Ls, down from 52,500 just five years ago.”). 




world problem.  If the professor’s work has true value, that value will remain 
whether the article is published in the Virginia Law Review or the Vermont 
Law Review.  Granted, many law school hiring and promotion decisions can 
be based on artificial distinctions between, for example, a publication in the 
top fifty versus the top sixty.104  But this is the professoriate’s self-inflicted 
problem; it is not the concern of journal editors.   
Additionally, nothing about an eight-hour offer window would diminish 
any particular professor’s chances of publishing in the higher ranked journals.  
Law review placements would still largely be based on things like letterhead 
bias, a professor’s connections with professors at more prestigious schools 
(who can recommend an article to their students on the law review), and 
similar factors that have nothing to do with substance or quality.  One newer 
professor explained: 
 
Not too long ago, I was an articles editor on a T14 flagship . . 
. . To even get to a full committee read, the professor needed 
to either (1) be a professor at a T14 law [school] (and not a 
clinical prof!), or (2) be named Orin Kerr or Eugene Volokh. 
. . . That might suggest that a professor at a Tier 4 school 
should aim for lower T50 law reviews and not worry so much 
about Cornell, Duke, Yale, etc.105 
 
For better or worse—well, for worse—all of this hero worship and other 
class-driven behavior would continue, even after the adoption of an eight-hour 
offer policy.  The non-clinical professors at the elite schools would still publish 
their articles in the elite journals.  Consequently, another professor’s advice to 
young academics would still remain sound: 
 
[M]ake friends among professors of the T40 schools, so that 
they can recommend your papers to the editors of their 
journals.  We do not know exactly how much networking and 
                                                 
104  One thing that causes law professors tremendous angst is that many publication 
offers must be accepted before the annual USN rankings are leaked.  The risk is that 
the journal could lose a great deal of prestige before the ink on the publication 
agreement is even dry.  This year, for example, the University of Miami and the 
University of New Mexico (and, therefore, their law reviews) both dropped seventeen 
spots and out of the so-called top sixty in the USN rankings.  See Kathryn Rubino, It’s 
Official—There’s a New T14 in Town! (2018 USNWR Rankings are Here), ABOVE 
THE LAW (Mar. 14, 2017), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/03/its-official-theres-a-new-
t-14-in-town-2018-usnwr-rankings-are-here/ [https://perma.cc/N7KX-UDLZ].    
105  newlawprof, Submission Angsting Fall 2016, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 13, 2016, 
12:54 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/07/submission-
angsting-fall-2016/comments/page/3/#comments [https://perma.cc/682J-6SLZ]. 
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letter[head] bias affect placement—the beneficiaries will 
never admit to being beneficiaries—but they are no doubt 
very significant factors.106   
 
The eight-hour offer reform would leave all of this unchanged.  The big 
difference under a widely-adopted eight-hour offer policy is that the sub-elite 
journals would no longer serve as screening devices.  That is, law professors 
and the elite journals could no longer rely on them to be the grease that keeps 
the class-based machinery humming along smoothly.  Instead, the eight-hour 
offer would lift the burden from the journal editors who are currently forced 
to read, evaluate, and make offers for articles they will never be able to publish. 
Not all journals will be interested in change.  The elite journals benefit 
from the current industry-standard, one-week offer window, as it gives them 
plenty of time to review and pickoff articles from lower ranked journals.  And 
some lower ranked journals may also be inclined to preserve the status quo.   
For example, the University of Louisville is currently ranked near the dead-
middle of the USN hierarchy.  At best, status-driven professors will view an 
offer from its law journal as a likely means to a better offer; at worst, those 
professors will treat the journal as one in which they would not, under any 
circumstances, publish.  Yet, as Timothy Lau explains in his discussion of 
letterhead bias,107 the University of Louisville Law Review has a formal policy 
“not to publish articles . . . that have been authored by someone other than a 
full-time law faculty member at an American Bar Association accredited law 
school.”108  A journal such as this may not want to implement any change that 
could upset the professors it so eagerly seeks to serve.   
Fortunately, the reform discussed in this Essay does not need to be system-
wide to disrupt the status quo.  Rather, a journal’s editors simply need to decide 
if they want to continue to serve the needs of the elite journals and the 
professors—many of whom revel in child-like distinctions between “T-14” 
and “T-20” and would not allow their work to be published outside the “T-
60”—or if they want to take the first step in implementing meaningful 
change.109  If only a single journal moved to the eight-hour offer window, that 
                                                 
106  Anon, Submission Angsting Spring 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 26, 2017, 8:33 
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/submission-angsting-
spring-2017/comments/page/10/#comments [https://perma.cc/F5TL-GQCR]. 
107  Lau, supra note 11.  
108  UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW: SUBMISSIONS: Print Edition 
Submissions, http://www.louisvillelawreview.org/submissions 
[https://perma.cc/3CMY-2LCB] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
109  This would also be an excellent opportunity for a journal to distinguish itself 
from other journals based on factors other than USN rank.  Many authors, for example, 
value early publication, a “light edit” policy, an easily navigable and searchable 
journal website, and favorable publication-agreement terms with regard to copyright. 




journal would likely gain some respect and reap some immediate benefits; 
further, from a larger perspective, other journals would likely follow. 
And if enough journals follow, they might even accomplish what one 
professor feared: they could “destabilize the entire, highly flawed, law review 
system that is central to [law professors’] careers.”110  
                                                 
110  Kim, supra note 49. 
